Implementing European Case Law at the Bureaucratic Frontline:How Domestic Signalling Influences the Outcomes of EU Law by Martinsen, Dorte Sindbjerg et al.
u n i ve r s i t y  o f  co pe n h ag e n  
Københavns Universitet
Implementing European Case Law at the Bureaucratic Frontline
Martinsen, Dorte Sindbjerg; Blauberger, Michael; Heindlmaier, Anita; Thierry, Jessica Maria
Sampson
Published in:
Public Administration
DOI:
10.1111/padm.12603
Publication date:
2019
Document version
Peer reviewed version
Citation for published version (APA):
Martinsen, D. S., Blauberger, M., Heindlmaier, A., & Thierry, J. M. S. (2019). Implementing European Case Law
at the Bureaucratic Frontline: How Domestic Signalling Influences the Outcomes of EU Law. Public
Administration, 97(4), 814-828. https://doi.org/10.1111/padm.12603
Download date: 01. Feb. 2020
1 
 
Implementing European Case Law at the Bureaucratic 
Frontline: How Domestic Signalling Influences the Outcomes 
of EU Law  
 
Dorte Sindbjerg Martinsen, University of Copenhagen, dm@ifs.ku.dk 
Michael Blauberger, University of Salzburg, michael.blauberger@sbg.ac.at 
Anita Heindlmaier, University of Salzburg, anita.heindlmaier@sbg.ac.at 
Jessica Sampson Thierry, University of Copenhagen, jmst@ifs.ku.dk 
 
 
Pre-print version as accepted in  
 
Public Administration 
 
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/padm.12603  
 
ABSTRACT 
This article analyses the implementation of European case law at the bureaucratic frontline of 
European Member States. Theoretically, insights from street-level implementation studies are 
combined with judicial impact research. Empirically, we compare how EU rules on free 
movement and cross-border welfare are applied in practice in Denmark, Austria and France. 
We find that when applying EU rules in practice, street-level bureaucrats are confronted with a 
world of legal complexity, consisting of ambiguous rules, underspecified concepts and a recent 
judicial turn by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). In order to manage 
complexity, street-level bureaucrats turn to their more immediate superiors for guidance. As a 
consequence, domestic signals shape the practical application of EU law. Despite bureaucratic 
discretion and many country differences, domestic signals create uniform, restrictive outcomes 
of EU law in all three cases We, thus, show that there is considerable room for politics – 
communicated by means of domestic signalling – in the EU implementation processes.    
KEYWORDS 
Free movement of workers, welfare benefits, Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), 
implementation, domestic signalling, bureaucratic frontline, street-level bureaucracy  
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1 INTRODUCTION  
Free movement and equal treatment of European Union (EU) citizens are among the core 
principles of European integration. If any further proof was needed, the Brexit referendum and 
its aftermath have demonstrated how politically salient these principles can become. However, 
despite their central role in European integration, little is known about their application in 
practice and how the bureaucratic frontline ultimately decides on the scope and limits of these 
rules.  
The bureaucratic frontline consists of street level bureaucrats (SLBs) handling the day-
to-day implementation of EU rules and rights. They are confronted with EU-related challenges. 
Firstly, the distance from abstract EU principles and rules to their street-level application is 
immense and involves many potential mitigating and diverting factors. Secondly, core EU 
policies such as free movement are often shaped by the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of 
the European Union (CJEU). Hence, implementation is not limited to ‘once and for all’ 
legislative transposition, but requires a continuous absorption of the Court’s evolving case law. 
And due to the case specific character of CJEU rulings, general policy formulations are difficult 
to derive. Such implementation challenges resemble what confront SLBs in federal states as 
well as in states with strong constitutional courts. As such EU challenges are not unique. 
However, the EU system adds an extra layer of complexity, likely to affect how SLBs attend to 
supranational rules.    
In this paper, we examine how SLBs in Denmark, Austria and France apply EU rules in 
practice. To do so, we combine insights from the literature on policy implementation (Lipsky, 
1980) with literature on judicial impact (Canon, 1991; Conant, 2002). These two strings of 
literature are likely to inform us of what shapes bureaucratic decisions at the street level when 
applying EU law in practice. In line with these literatures, we examine how ambiguous legal 
principles and case law influence decision-making at the bureaucratic frontline. When 
implementing EU rules on free movement and equal treatment, SLBs are confronted with a 
world of legal complexity and underspecified concepts stemming from both EU legislation and 
the jurisprudence of the CJEU. Two rather different expectations on how SLBs deal with this 
discretion arise from this. On the one hand, practical implementers are likely to employ a variety 
of coping strategies and to be influenced by individual motivations. Accordingly, one might 
expect to find considerable variation in the decision-making of SLBs. Variation can be caused 
by EU legal ambiguity, since the three selected country cases differ on key parameters but also 
by SLBs’ individual motivations in case-handling. On the other hand, we develop an alternative 
expectation. Domestic signalling from the superiors of SLBs may guide their behaviour, leading 
to a more uniform application of EU rules and rights on the ground. Uniform application can 
be the outcome, as signalling denotes the importance and content assigned to a policy from the 
superior. The two expectations thus contrast on how European rules play out on the ground. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section two brings together two distinct literatures on 
respectively street-level implementation and judicial impact. They inform the two theoretical 
expectations on discretion and control of frontline bureaucrats in the EU. Section three presents 
the legal framework on free movement and equal treatment. In section four, we compare three 
country cases – Denmark, Austria and France – which differ in numerous respects both within 
and across countries, but exhibit striking similarities in terms of the outcomes that result from 
frontline application of European case law. Section five concludes.  
2 STREET-LEVEL IMPLEMENTATION AND JUDICIAL IMPACT  
EU implementation studies have recently taken a new turn, exploring and explaining how EU 
legislation and jurisprudence are applied in practice (Blauberger, 2013; Falkner, Treib, 
Hartlapp, & Leiber, 2005; Hofmann, 2018; Thomann & Sager, 2017b; Versluis, 2007a; 
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Zhelyazkova, Kaya, & Schrama, 2016). Among other puzzles, the emerging literature 
investigates the outcomes of rather complex EU legislation, when implemented on the ground 
and their variation across national institutions, different administrative traditions as well as 
different compliance cultures.  
On the one hand, implementation studies lead us to expect varying outcomes of EU rules. 
The high level of legal ambiguity in EU rules enhances administrative discretion. One of the 
pioneering implementation researchers emphasised the role of conflict and found it to continue 
from policy formulation, through decision-making into policy implementation (Bardach, 1977). 
One reason is that conflicts about policy formulation often result in policies marked by 
ambiguous goals and rules (Winter, 2012, p. 258). Ambiguous compromises may facilitate 
agreement in the first place, but they complicate matters at later stages of implementation, 
delaying transposition (Steunenberg & Toshkov, 2009) and allowing for discretionary rule 
application. Apart from a great variety of country-level factors accounting for differentiated 
Europeanization (Treib, 2014), EU implementation scholars recently started to explore how 
ambiguity affects the application of European law at the individual level of frontline 
bureaucrats. Drawing on insights from social psychology, Dörrenbacher finds that in contexts 
of high legal ambiguity, street-level bureaucrats’ individual motivation influences their use of 
EU law (Dörrenbächer, 2017). As a result, the extent to which the frontline bureaucracy relies 
on EU law varies and produces different administrative decisions. EU law delegates discretion 
to practical implementers, ‘who thus become, in essence, EU lawmakers’ (Dörrenbächer & 
Mastenbroek, 2017). Implementers are creative and flexible when using legal tools, which leads 
to variation in implementation practices. 
In a similar vein, judicial impact studies have shown that unclear jurisprudence lends 
itself to discretionary application on the ground – either accidentally, simply by leaving 
implementers uncertain about judges’ intent, or intentionally, by providing leeway for 
application in line with the implementers’ own preferences (Baum, 1976, p. 92). Moreover, 
based upon this literature, we should expect policies that are strongly shaped by jurisprudence 
to exhibit particularly high degrees of legal ambiguity. Individual judgments often create 
additional legal ambiguity as to their broader implications (Baum, 1976, p. 93). In contrast to 
legislation, jurisprudence is always case-specific and fragmented. Moreover, high courts face a 
particular dilemma of providing guidance without constraining too much their own flexibility 
to respond to future developments. Any obvious deviation or even turnaround of established 
precedent would only increase legal ambiguity and, hence, the likelihood of varied 
implementation. In the EU context, CJEU rulings often include broad interpretative guidelines, 
but leave considerable discretion for their domestic application, a strategy which is seen as 
crucial to ensure national courts’ loyalty (Davies, 2012, p. 88). For frontline bureaucrats, 
however, trying to handle mass proceedings efficiently and predictably, discretion often appears 
as a curse rather than a blessing (Blauberger & Schmidt, 2017, p. 4).  
Faced with legal ambiguity, frontline bureaucrats typically employ a broad variety of 
coping strategies. Their basic dilemma is one of using discretion in order to account for the 
individual situations of their clients, while managing mass proceedings efficiently and 
predictably (Lipsky, 1980, p. 18). Building on Lipsky, coping has been defined as the 
‘behavioral efforts frontline workers employ when interacting with clients, in order to master, 
tolerate, or reduce external and internal demands and conflicts they face on an everyday basis’ 
(Tummers, Bekkers, Vink, & Musheno, 2015, p. 1100). A great diversity of such coping 
strategies has been identified and classified. Tummers et al. broadly distinguish between coping 
strategies benefitting the frontline worker – such as routinizing and rationing the treatment of 
clients instead of conducting individual assessments – and those coping strategies serving the 
clients’ interests – for example the bending or breaking of rules to meet client demands or the 
prioritizing of some clients (2015, p. 1108). 
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On the other hand, domestic signalling may direct frontline bureaucrats to a specific 
interpretation of EU law. Signalling denotes how superiors communicate or interpret the 
importance and content of a policy (May & Winter, 2009, p. 454). Via signalling principals or 
superiors can indicate their interpretation of, interest in and the importance they assign to a 
policy matter. Signalling may thus mitigate distances between the preferences of a principal 
and its agent, reduce the agent’s discretion when applying a policy (Banks & Weingast, 1992) 
and steer bureaucratic responses in a specific direction (Brehm & Gates, 1999). However, 
signalling should not be mistaken for continuous hierarchical control or top-down interference 
with street-level decisions. It is unlikely to steer specific case handling directly, but instead 
conveys how the superior would prioritise or decide in a similar case or situation. Signalling 
may thus be especially effective when a case is unclear and in need of external advice or 
direction. 
The signalling approach suggests that bureaucratic routines and decision-making are 
influenced by issue salience (Worsham & Gatrell, 2005). Issue salience implies that a topic has 
high visibility and importance (Versluis, 2007a). High issue salience may be stable and 
established bureaucratic routines will prioritise the matter. At other times, salience increases, 
leading to intensified signals and changes in bureaucratic routines. Here superiors come to 
assign an increasing salience to a specific policy. Changes in government or important shifts in 
public opinion are among the background factors, which may explain why new signals emerge 
or intensify.  
In an EU context, signalling can in principle come from supranational as well as national 
superiors. It can take several venues and may differ according to the sender. However, 
implementation scholars note that SLBs are more likely to be influenced by the signals of more 
immediate superiors, hence actors at the domestic level (May & Winter, 2009). But also at the 
domestic level, superiors may send different signals. Thus in a multilevel system as the EU, 
multiple superiors may signal differently, communicating contradictory interests and 
understandings of the same policy (Worsham & Gatrell, 2005). So far implementation theory 
has mainly assigned importance to signals stemming from the political or managerial level. 
However, in the EU as well as in other political systems with a strong judiciary, also signals 
from courts are likely to influence bureaucratic case-handling. Thus in our combined 
framework, domestic signals may come from political, administrative or judicial superiors. 
Political superiors, that is elected decision-makers, signal their policy preferences through 
many channels such as public statements, legislation, proposals for legislative reform or 
interventions in courts. Administrative superiors, that is civil servants in the responsible 
ministry, agency, at the regional or local level, signal by means of executive orders, guidelines, 
organisation of training seminars or regular monitoring of frontline decisions. Judicial 
superiors, that is domestic courts or quasi-judicial bodies, signal their interpretation of EU legal 
principles in the way and extent to which they apply CJEU doctrine to the facts of individual 
cases. 
By their wording of an EU policy or their interpretation of EU law, superiors 
communicate 1) the importance they assign to a supranational rule as for example the 
importance of equal access for EU citizens to welfare benefits and they 2) give direction to how 
the content of a policy should be interpreted, for example whether underspecified concepts or 
ambiguous EU law should be interpreted restrictively or expansively. Substantive domestic 
signals may push frontline bureaucrats to use their room for interpretation in a certain direction 
as for example towards a more restrictive interpretation of EU law. The effect will be stronger 
if different superiors signal in the same direction. Consensus on how to read a law may 
gradually emerge when different superiors communicate and interact. When political superiors 
communicate their understandings of a policy, the administrative superior is likely to take these 
signals on board when communicating legislative objective further down the chain of 
implementation. Also when it comes to the judicial branch, positive reactions by government 
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officials and favourable commentary by opinion leaders are expected to strengthen judicial 
impact (Levine, 1970, p. 591). By contrast, the more uniformly implementers disagree with a 
specific line of judicial reasoning, the more likely they are to obstruct broader judicial impact 
(Canon, 1991, p. 444). Accordingly, courts are understood as potential ‘catalyst(s) of change 
rather than a singular effector of change’ in this literature (Levine, 1970, p. 592). Thus, also 
when it comes to courts, domestic signalling may influence the assessment of individual cases.  
In sum, legal ambiguity and signalling lead to different expectations regarding the 
behaviour and decisions of SLBs. From a perspective focusing on SLBs’ coping with legal 
ambiguity, we should therefore expect that the outcomes of frontline bureaucrats’ decision-
making differ greatly between and within our three country cases. Yet, when considering the 
implications of domestic signalling, we should expect that the outcomes of frontline 
bureaucrats’ decision-making could converge if signalling guides SLBs in the same direction.  
3 FREE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS AND CROSS-BORDER WELFARE: 
AMBIGUOUS RULES, LEGAL UNCERTAINTY 
The rules that govern EU citizens’ right to free movement and cross-border welfare consist of 
primary law, secondary legislation and a considerable complex of CJEU decisions. Article 45 
of the Treaty lays down that workers in the European Union have freedom of movement and 
cannot be discriminated against based on nationality. The Treaty’s article 48 adds that in order 
to facilitate freedom of movement, the worker has the right to access the social security schemes 
of other Member States and to export previously earned social security rights.  
In order to realise these Treaty objectives, the European Community adopted some of its 
first regulations within the field. Regulation 883/2004, grants access to and exportability of a 
wide range of social security benefits for EU citizens and their family members, including 
health care; maternity and equivalent paternity benefits; old-age benefits; unemployment 
benefits, and family benefits, but not social assistance. In addition, regulation 492/2011 covers 
workers as well as their family members who have access to all social advantages in a host 
member state including social assistance and study grants. However, in general, these social 
advantages cannot be exported. Finally, in terms of secondary legislation, the Residence 
Directive 2004/38 lays down that every EU citizen has the right to reside on the territory of 
another EU country the first three months with no conditions other than holding a valid identity 
card or passport. Residence for more than three months is subject to certain conditions, which 
vary depending on the citizen’s status. Workers and self-employed and their direct family 
members have the right to reside without any conditions. Jobseekers have the right to reside 
without any conditions for a period of six months and even longer, if they continue to have a 
‘genuine chance’ of getting work. Economically inactive persons (e.g. unemployed, retired, 
etc.) have the right to reside for longer than three months if they have health insurance and 
‘sufficient resources’ for themselves and their family not to become a burden on the hosting 
member state’s social assistance system. Sufficient resources, for their part, may not be defined 
as a fixed amount, and may in any case not be higher than the threshold for social assistance. 
Rather, Member States need to consider the individual situation of the person (Art. 8 (4) 
Directive 2004/38). 
In many proceedings before the Court, the CJEU has been asked to clarify the social rights 
of EU citizens. Concerning the concept of worker, the Court has broadened its definition to also 
include persons with low income and part-time work. In the case of Kempf (C-139/85), the 
CJEU established that working 12 hours per week would suffice, and in the case of Megner and 
Scheffel (C-444/93), it ruled that 10 hours of work per week did not exclude a person from 
obtaining worker status. In Ninni-Orasche (C-413/01), the CJEU stated that a fixed-term 
contract for ten weeks was sufficient to be a worker under EU law. However, at the same time, 
the expansive judicial interpretations have not been codified into secondary legislation by the 
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EU legislature (Martinsen, 2015). It remains up to the member states to interpret the worker 
concept in concrete case-handling, thus leaving more leeway for discretion in practical 
implementation. 
When it comes to the social rights of economically inactive EU citizens who have not 
achieved permanent residence after five years, the CJEU first added flesh to the bones of 
European citizenship. In the Sala case from 1998 (C-85/96), the Court introduced Union 
citizenship as a fundamental status of member state nationals (Dougan, 2013, p. 133). This 
judicial vision of European citizenship was confirmed and extended in Grzelczyk (C-184/99) 
and Baumbast (C-413/99), among other cases. The Court stated that if a ‘certain link’ had been 
established before the five years of residence, the individual might enjoy the right to equal 
treatment under EU law, however left the definition of such a link open. Recently, the CJEU 
appears to have undertaken a judicial turn, embarking on a much more restrictive line of 
interpretation. With Dano (C-333/13), Alimanovic (C-67/14), Garcia-Nieto (C-299/14) and 
Commission vs UK (C-308/14) among others, we see a clear turn away from the previous 
judicial vision of European citizenship. In these cases, the Court refrained from basing its 
interpretations on the Union Citizenship wording of primary law and instead turned to the 
conditioned rights of secondary legislation as stated in the Residence Directive. Legal residence 
presupposes the right to equal treatment. Sufficient resources and not becoming an 
unreasonable burden thus become requirements for obtaining and maintaining the right to 
reside, and only those with legal residence have a right to equal treatment. However, we find 
no judicial clarification of when EU citizens fulfil the requirements. The legislative provisions 
are vaguely formulated and ambiguous which allows for discrepancies in implementation 
(Thym, 2015, p. 26). The case law of the Court could have clarified the meaning of primary 
and secondary law, but the judicial turn and the open character of these interpretations leave 
confusion, which again allows for arbitrary applications on the ground.  
Reading into the provisions of secondary law and subsequent judicial interpretations 
hereof, it stands out that key concepts remain rather open or underspecified. Such 
underspecified concepts or provisions in particular count the concept of worker and the social 
protection hereunder, the social rights of economically inactive EU citizens who have not yet 
achieved permanent residence, in particular what constitutes sufficient resources and when an 
EU citizen can be considered an ‘unreasonable burden’ to the social assistance system of a 
hosting Member State. The legal uncertainty ultimately gives wider room for interpretation at 
the national level and in the practical implementation process. Whether this leads to variation 
on the ground or whether SLBs receive and follow domestic signals will be addressed in the 
subsequent empirical part of the paper. 
 
4 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
4.1 Case selection and data 
We trace street-level implementation of European case law on cross-border welfare in three 
country case studies, namely Denmark, Austria and France. We examine 1) how SLBs in the 
respective countries apply the concept of worker, and 2) the social rights of  economically 
inactive EU citizens who have not yet achieved permanent residence, in particular what 
constitutes sufficient resources as well as ‘unreasonable burden’ when it comes to welfare 
access. The specific welfare benefit examined in the three cases was the social assistance 
scheme (Denmark: kontanthjælp; Austria: bedarfsorientierte Mindestsicherung, earlier: 
Sozialhilfe; France: revenu de solidarité active, earlier: revenu minimum d’insertion).  
We selected Denmark, Austria and France as these countries differ on a number of 
explanatory factors that are well established in the literatures on EU compliance and 
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comparative Europeanisation studies (see Table 1). The three Member States belong to different 
welfare models (Esping-Andersen, 1990), different ‘worlds of compliance’ (Falkner et al., 
2005) and they differ with regard to centralised or federal structures as well as their general 
acceptance or reluctance towards supranational judicial review (Wind, 2010). Not least, these 
institutional factors lead us to expect different outcomes in the street-level implementation of 
EU law. 
 
 
 
Table 1: Institutional Differences across Country Cases   
 Denmark Austria France 
Welfare model Social-democratic, 
universal 
Conservative, social 
insurance based 
Conservative, social 
insurance based 
Worlds of 
compliance 
World of compliance World of domestic 
politics 
World of neglect 
Administrative 
structure 
Unitary state, but 
with considerable 
decentralisation   
Federal state Unitary state 
Judicial review Weak Strong Weak  
 
 
We conducted in total 62 semi-structured interviews in Denmark, Austria and France, mostly 
with SLBs or other local employees close to the case-handling process and their superiors. 
Together, they decide upon social assistance claims and the residence rights of EU migrants 
(see Table 2). Two sets of interview questions were particularly relevant for the following 
analysis. Firstly, we asked case workers how they applied the EU legal principles and provisions 
identified above in practice, e.g. the concept of worker or the threshold of sufficient resources. 
Secondly, we asked to what extent they kept track of the evolving case law of the CJEU 
themselves and what other instructions or guidance, they received on how to apply these EU 
legal principles. Additional interviews were conducted with rights advocacy groups. We 
triangulated our interview data with systematic and longitudinal tracing of policy documents, 
legislative developments, judicial interpretation and, wherever accessible, internal guidelines 
on the application of EU law in the context of EU migrants’ access to welfare benefits. This 
moreover enabled tracing of respectively political, administrative and judicial signalling in each 
of the three country cases, as illustrated in Table 2.  
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Table 2: Data Collection 
 Denmark Austria France 
Political 
signalling 
Legislative developments 
via national legislative 
database 
(‘www.retsinformation.dk’) 
and respondents, debates in 
Parliament and policy 
programmes via 
parliamentary website 
(‘ft.dk/da/dokumenter’) 
Legislative developments 
via national legislative 
database 
(https://www.ris.bka.gv.at) 
and respondents, debates in 
Parliament and policy 
programmes via 
parliamentary website 
(https://www.parlament.gv.
at) 
Legislative developments 
via national legislative 
database 
(https://www.legifrance.go
uv.fr) and respondents, 
debates in Parliament and 
policy programmes via 
parliamentary website 
(http://www2.assemblee-
nationale.fr/documents-
parlementaires) 
Administr
ative 
signalling 
Ministerial legislative 
guidelines via national 
legislative database 
(‘retsinformation.dk’), 
caseworker guidelines 
when available, course 
material when accessible, 
ministerial orders via 
respondents 
Guidelines of district 
administrations and regions 
(the latter in the case of 
Vienna) if applicable, 
manual of the Ministry of 
the Interior, orders via 
respondents 
Circulars and information 
notes of the Ministry of 
Social Affairs and of the 
head office of the agency 
competent for minimum 
resources (Caisse nationale 
des allocations familiales) 
Judicial 
signalling 
National court cases via 
national judicial database 
(‘Ugeskrift for Retsvæsen’), 
administrative principle 
rulings via ‘Ankestyrelsen’  
National court cases via 
national judicial database 
(https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/J
udikatur) 
National court cases via 
national judicial database 
(https://www.legifrance.go
uv.fr/Sites/Juridictions); 
social rulings via bulletins 
on social jurisprudence 
(http://solidarites-
sante.gouv.fr/ministere/doc
umentation-et-
publications-
officielles/bulletins-
officiels/article/cahiers-de-
jurisprudence-de-l-aide-
sociale). 
Frontline 
practices 
Interviews with 11 
respondents  
(municipalities, Ministry of 
Employment, residence 
permit agency, immigration 
services) 
Interviews with 371 
respondents (district 
administrations, regional 
administrations, Ministry 
of Social Affairs, Ministry 
of the Interior, rights 
advocacy groups) 
Interviews with 14 
respondents (district 
administrations, local 
branches of the agency 
competent for minimum 
resources, head office of 
the relevant agency, 
Ministry of Social Affairs, 
Ministry of the Interior, 
rights advocacy groups) 
 
 
1 More interviews were conducted for Austria because of federalism where social assistance is within the competence of the 
regions. 
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In the remainder of this article, we present our findings on SLBs’ case-handling for our three 
country cases. The engagement with the bureaucratic frontline reveals a predominantly 
restrictive administrative practice across all three Member States caused by domestic signalling.  
4.2 Denmark  
When an EU citizen applies for Danish social assistance, the decision is made by street-level 
bureaucrats in the local municipality. Despite belonging to the Social Democratic, universal 
welfare model with ’decommodified’ social rights (Esping-Andersen, 1990), main access to 
Danish welfare as an EU citizen depends on whether the person qualifies as a ‘worker’ under 
European law. This makes the frontline decision on the applicant’s ‘worker status’ essential for 
the right to equal treatment. Economically inactive EU citizens are on the other hand in most 
cases excluded from the social assistance scheme. The Danish case shows that domestic 
signalling is of high importance, especially when street-level bureaucrats are left without 
sufficient guidance on the complex and contradictory European free movement rules. 
At first sight, the Danish interpretation of the worker concept seems clear. In response to 
CJEU case law, one obtains worker status in Denmark upon 10-12 working hours per week 
over at least 10 weeks.2 This message is remarkably well known among frontline workers. 
Administrative signalling has thus clearly communicated this through websites and guidelines, 
yet ignored how complex the decision typically is in in practice. Especially fluctuating working 
hours and the level of salary cause frontline trouble. Both factors are often relevant in EU 
citizens’ cases as they are overrepresented in precarious employment relations in Denmark.3 In 
result, municipalities are left without guidance and in some cases even establish restrictive local 
rules (Interview, 28 March 2017). Given the strong political and administrative signalling 
described below, frontlines often opt for the safer option of rejecting borderline applications.  
Up until recently, frontline bureaucrats would send a ‘control case’ to the residence permit 
authority, the ‘State Administration’, when in doubt whether an EU citizen was eligible to social 
assistance (interview, 7 September 2015). In March 2014, however, a clear political message 
was sent. A policy package launched by the Social Democratic coalition government instructed 
municipalities to refer all EU applicants without permanent residence for an additional check-
up and not only those deemed to be borderline cases.4 In this way, the State Administration 
obtains stricter control with frontline decisions. Moreover, the authority has in this period 
become increasingly restrictive in their daily interpretations (interview, 27 March 2017). One 
example is concerning the sanctions that jobcentres issue if beneficiaries do not fulfil their 
obligations. Municipalities are now asked to refer EU citizens who have been subject to such 
sanctions as this might be sufficient ground to terminate their legal residence (interview, 27 and 
28 March 2017). Meantime, the State Administration has become more active in disseminating 
the national interpretation of the rules through intensified frequency of visits and training 
sessions among municipalities (interview, 28 March 2017).  
Municipalities have in general become more restrictive, increasingly often refusing social 
assistance with reference to lack of legal residence (interview, 28 September 2015). In our 
interviews, this is explained by more restrictive administrative signalling from the State 
Administration but also from the national political level. Political signalling travels from the 
superiors and into the local administration:  
“It is a political signalling from the top. And we have to follow it if we want to keep our 
job. It [signalling] has simply become more restrictive. Also with the same law. It is the 
 
2 Danish Immigration Service, administrative instructions, November 2015. 
3 Danish Agency for Labour Market and Recruitment 28 August 2018 J.nr. 18/11780. 
4 Ministry of Employment, March 2014, ’ Forslag 1: Øget kontrol af kontanthjælpsmodtageres arbejdstagerstatus’. 
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interpretation of the law which has become more restrictive.” (Interview, 27 March 
2017). 
Both political and administrative signalling thus clearly shows through in the Danish case. 
Judicial signalling has on the other hand remained rather low. Between 2002 and 2017, 
no Danish Court case considered EU citizens’ right to social assistance. The only judicial 
interpretation made is through quasi-judicial redress in the administrative recourse system. In 
this period, only seven such ‘principle’ rulings concerned EU citizens’ right to social assistance 
and in only four cases the benefit was granted (Martinsen, Pons Rotger, & Thierry, 2018). 
Judicial superiors have thus not signalled importance of EU law to SLBs in the Danish case. 
Subsequently, caseworkers typically do not consider EU legislation or CJEU jurisprudence 
directly but look into national (case) law and guidelines for instructions. The impact of CJEU 
jurisprudence on the social rights of EU citizens thus depends on changes of national legislation, 
guidelines, legal minutes issued by the Ministry of Justice or domestic court cases.  At times, 
CJEU case law is not even heard of at the municipal level (interviews, 27 and 28 March 2017).   
Before the Dano and Alimanovic cases, there was a concern that the jurisprudence of the 
Court would impair the restrictive Danish practice on EU citizens’ right to social assistance. 
The Danish government therefore submitted observations in both cases. The government 
welcomed the restrictive approach in the judgements, interpreting them to confirm the 
restrictive Danish practice and to spare the government from changing Danish legislation or 
ministerial guidelines.5 In response to the case Commission vs the UK (C-308/14), the Minister 
of Employment signals satisfaction with the judicial turn:  
“Even though the judgment does not have a concrete impact for Denmark, I find it 
positive that the CJEU continues the line from other, recent judgements. The CJEU has 
laid down that even though the requirement on legal residence indirectly discriminates 
against EU citizens, the requirement is justified to protect public finances” (answer to 
the Parliament’s Committee on Integration, parliamentary question no. 718, 24. June 
2016).  
 
Economically inactive EU citizens without permanent residence are in most cases excluded 
from Danish social assistance. They can acquire legal residence if they have ‘sufficient 
resources’. Administrative signalling in this respect is clear and restrictive. The competent 
national agency explicitly states that sufficient resources are assessed on an individual basis, 
however generally amounting to the level of a social assistance benefit plus housing benefit.6 
If an EU citizen with legal residence on these grounds loses his/her sufficient means and applies 
for social assistance, the caseworker will report to the State Administration who subsequently 
may terminate the right to reside. In such situations, the caseworker will decide upon an 
individual assessment whether to grant social assistance temporarily. This, however, will be 
regarded as a compromising factor if s/he later applies for permanent residence in Denmark 
(interview, 28 September 2015; see also the official website ‘New to Denmark’ on public 
benefits). 
In sum, we see Danish frontline administration of EU law as becoming uniformly more 
restrictive because of more restrictive administrative and political signalling. When coping with 
the legal ambiguity and underspecified concepts of EU law, caseworkers turn to the political 
and administrative signalling for guidance. The impact of CJEU case law is thus in part 
conditioned by national actors, and mitigated by the way they read, understand and 
communicate jurisprudence to the frontline. In result, municipalities will typically not consider 
 
5 See European Affairs Committee, parliamentary questions no. 28, 5. December 2014 and no. 3, 12. October 2015 as well as 
the Parliament’s Committee on Integration, parliamentary question no. 567, 26. May 2016 
6 See the State Administration guidelines at http://www.statsforvaltningen.dk/site.aspx?p=9202, accessed 8. February 2019. 
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Court jurisprudence themselves but rely on national level actors for a legal translation. The 
national level refused the impact of the earlier more expansive jurisprudence but welcomed the 
later restrictive turn of the CJEU, which instead corresponded with the established practice.  
4.3 Austria  
In Austria, EU migrants’ claims for social assistance are decided by caseworkers in the social 
units of district administrations who apply the relevant regional legislation on social assistance. 
In addition, caseworkers in the immigration units of district administrations often play a crucial 
role by controlling the legal residence of EU citizens, which is a precondition for accessing 
benefits. As in the Danish case, Austrian frontline bureaucrats have followed domestic signals 
to restrict EU citizens’ access to welfare benefits over the last decade. This restrictive trend is 
pronounced with regard to economically inactive EU citizens without permanent residence, and 
also with regard to workers as long as domestic courts do not challenge this by signalling an 
expansive interpretation of the rules.  
The EU concept of worker is far from clear for Austrian frontline bureaucrats who 
typically do not consider EU law directly. Their basic instruments are Austrian law and orders, 
which they expect to be EU compliant. EU citizens were typically automatically treated on 
equal terms with Austrians up until 2006 where a legal reform changed the practices. Political 
signals here pointed towards restriction. Austria’s original transposition of Directive 2004/38 
in 2006 and later reforms explicitly aimed at restricting welfare access of EU citizens. With the 
2006 reform, EU citizens are now obliged to obtain a registration certificate documenting – and 
not establishing – legal residence. Subsequently, welfare authorities are instructed to restrict 
access to social assistance to EU citizens who can show a registration certificate.  
In response to administrative signals, immigration authorities, who issue the certificate, 
have furthermore become more restrictive when determining legal residence and deciding upon 
the registration certificate. This turn implies that immigration authorities are now instructed to 
require that the employment fulfils the definition under national insurance provisions and hence 
exceed a low income threshold (€438,05 in 2018)7. Some immigration authorities demand the 
level of the salary to correspond with the social assistance level. In contrast to the Danish case, 
administrative signalling occurs more ad hoc and hardly coordinated at the federal level 
(interview, 1 September 2016), not least since social assistance is regional competence. For 
example, when asked about her receptiveness to CJEU jurisprudence, one caseworker explains 
that she had received a print-out of the Dano judgment from her regional manager without any 
specific instructions but the general advice of using it to be ‘restrictive’ whenever possible 
(interview, 29 October 2015). 
We identify few examples of more generous practice prompted by expansive local 
judicial signalling. In some larger cities, welfare authorities have started to assess themselves 
whether a person is a worker and no longer rely on the registration certificate. Two respondents 
explain that they apply a ‘Genc threshold’ of 5.5 hours (Genc, C-14/09) to identify ‘genuine 
and effective work’. These local managers are aware that this is the most generous precedent 
but argue that any other approach would hardly be manageable in practice nor resilient against 
legal challenges (interview, 3 October 2016). Indeed, some domestic courts referred to EU law 
and insisted on an expansive interpretation. For instance, the administrative court of Vienna 
considered seven hours with a salary of 100 euro per week within the definition of work.8 
Altogether, restrictive political and administrative signalling clearly show through in the 
Austrian case, leading to a restrictive administration of the concept of ‘worker’ on the ground. 
This is, however, counteracted in some cities by more expansive judicial signalling.  
 
7 Cf. the website of the Bundeskanzleramt at https://www.help.gv.at/Portal.Node/hlpd/public/content/99/Seite.990119.html, 
accessed 13 November 2018. 
8 Administrative court of Vienna, judgment of 5 October 2015, VGW-141/023/9654/2015. 
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Austrian administrative practice towards economically inactive EU citizens has also 
become increasingly restrictive over the last decade. Consequently, similar to the Danish 
situation, EU citizens without worker status are now effectively excluded from social assistance 
and are threatened to lose their residence right if they apply for social benefits. In order to 
restrict their access to welfare, Austrian frontline bureaucrats raised the ‘sufficient resources’ 
threshold. Despite considerable cross-regional legislative variation regarding social assistance 
(Windisch-Graetz, 2014), the practice is uniform towards restrictive rule application.  
In most Austrian regions, economically inactive EU citizens with legal residence may – 
in principle – qualify for social assistance. In practice, however, it has become almost 
impossible for them to acquire the registration certificate and claim welfare benefits at the same 
time. As elaborated earlier, it has become increasingly difficult to receive the certificate. In the 
case of economically inactive EU citizens, immigration authorities have become more reluctant 
to take saving deposits into account when assessing ‘sufficient resources’ (interview, 29 
October 2015). Rather, EU citizens must document some sort of regular income and, even 
though EU law prohibits a fixed threshold to determine ‘sufficient resources’, the guidelines 
from the Ministry of Interior suggest caseworkers to apply a threshold of to the regional level 
of social assistance (interview, 28 January 2016). In 2010, Austria further restricted practice by 
revising the residence legislation. In result, receipt of a supplementary pension is now excluded 
when calculating sufficient resources (Felten, 2012). As an example of clear administrative 
signalling, the Ministry of Social Affairs explicitly finds it ‘problematic’ if economically 
inactive EU citizens apply for social assistance. Receipt of benefits may, it is stated, terminate 
their right to reside as the application alone may suggest that the EU citizen is an ‘unreasonable 
burden’ (Bundesministerium für Arbeit Soziales und Konsumentenschutz, 2014, p. 11, 14). 
When granting social assistance, welfare authorities should thus inform the immigration 
authority. 
Some Austrian welfare authorities have started to assess legal residence themselves 
independently from the registration certificate whenever EU citizens apply for social assistance 
and reject the benefit request of economically inactive persons for not having sufficient 
resources (interview, 3 October 2016). Since 2010, the city of Vienna has excluded 
economically inactive EU citizens from social assistance already at the legislative level. This 
was confirmed by the administrative court of Vienna and now only migrant workers qualify for 
social assistance in this region.9 While this automatic exclusion raised legal doubts in the past 
(Windisch-Graetz, 2014), the CJEU’s recent Dano and Alimanovic rulings are interpreted as a 
confirmation of Vienna’s restrictive approach (interview, 1 September 2016). Moreover, in 
order to qualify for permanent residency in this region, five years of residence cannot stand 
alone but requires five years of documented employment and comprehensive health insurance 
(interview, 26 January 2016). Also this practice is highly restrictive and even goes further than 
the Danish practice where consumption of welfare is merely regarded as a compromising factor 
in the overall assessment. 
The reform of residence legislation from 2010 was challenged in court leading to the Brey 
judgment in which the CJEU emphasized the criterion of an unreasonable burden and required 
decisions based on individual assessments. In its interpretation of the ruling, the Austrian 
Supreme Court10 basically considered the registration certificate as constitutive. This 
interpretation was followed by some regional courts holding that EU citizens were entitled to 
social assistance as long as the registration certificate was not revoked.11 In 2016, the Austrian 
Supreme Court partly reversed its own Brey jurisprudence and endorsed the ruling of a lower 
court instead, which argued that the CJEU’s Dano and Alimanovic rulings had corrected its 
 
9 For instance: administrative court of Vienna, judgment of 15 January 2014. 
10 Austrian Supreme Court (Oberster Gerichtshof), judgment of 17 December 2013, 10ObS152/13w. 
11 For instance: administrative court of Salzburg, judgment of 22 July 2015, LVwG-9/160/19-2015. 
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earlier Brey decision in a more restrictive direction12, thus no longer pushing for an expansive 
interpretation of EU law. This line was taken up by lower courts.13 
In sum, despite the federal system Austrian bureaucrats have in recent years changed 
practice towards a predominantly uniform, restrictive interpretation both concerning 
economically inactive EU citizens and workers. The change is found to be caused by restrictive 
political and administrative signalling and to some extent judicial signalling. In some regions, 
the worker definition is, however, administered generously due to expansive judicial signalling. 
CJEU case law has been interpreted through this restrictive lens of domestic signals and only 
with some exceptions result in a restrictive trend across Austria. 
4.4 France 
In France, EU citizens’ applications for social assistance are administered by caseworkers in 
either the social units of district administrations or the district offices of a national agency. Also 
caseworkers in immigration authorities are involved in the assessment if the EU citizen applies 
for an – optional – registration certificate. The certificate allows for welfare access with the 
social authorities. As in the Austrian and Danish case, French frontline bureaucrats have 
listened to domestic signals of superiors within the last decade and restricted EU citizens’ access 
to social assistance. Both eligibility of economically inactive EU citizens without permanent 
residence and the concept of ‘worker’ are now subject to narrow interpretation. 
French interpretation of worker status and thus access to social assistance is 
administered under the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health and the head office of the agency 
competent for family benefits, the National Family Benefits Fund (Caisse nationale des 
allocations familiales, CNAF).  Circulars of the two institutions from 2005 only included the 
ambiguous Court formulations that employment should be ‘genuine and effective’.14 In 2008 
and 2009, two new pieces of guidelines were introduced and established a clear but restrictive 
definition of the ‘worker’ concept.15 The new guidelines identify two alternative ways of 
assessment: Caseworkers can either ask health insurance institutions whether the person is 
insured as a worker, or, secondly, they examine themselves whether the person within 30 
consecutive days has worked at least 60 hours or had a salary at least 60 times higher than the 
minimum hourly wage16, i.e. at least 588 euro in 2018 (interview, 31 August 2016). Apart from 
providing legal certainty, these efforts are expected to harmonize the practices throughout 
France (interview, 16 June and 21 July 2017). 
Caseworkers quickly adopted these clear definitions of the circulars into their practice. 
Some local welfare authorities opt for the first way and consult the health insurance institution 
to find whether the person is insured as a worker (interview, 29 July and 24 August & 31 August 
2016). Other local welfare authorities follow the second procedure and examine the conditions 
as laid down in the instruments (interview, 8 and 18 July and 10 August and 16 September 
2016). Ultimately, the new practice makes it more difficult to obtain worker status and excludes 
EU citizens in more precarious work from social protection. This group subsequently loses the 
possibility to top up their income with social assistance. Administrative signalling of superior 
actors thus clearly shows through in the French case regarding the definition of worker.  
Economically inactive EU citizens without permanent residence have, in large, been 
excluded from social assistance in practice. Although EU citizens since 2003 have been spared 
the requirement of a registration certificate,17 they are still advised to apply for the document 
 
12 Austrian Supreme Court, judgment of 10 May 2016, 10 ObS 15/16b. 
13 For instance: administrative court of Salzburg, judgment of 16 November 2016, 405-9/123/1/12-2016. 
14 Ministère de l'Emploi, du Travail et de la Cohésion Sociale, information note N°DGAS/1C/2005/165 du 24 mars 2005, p. 4. 
15 Caisse Nationale des Allocations Familiales, circular n° 2008-024; Caisse Nationale des Allocations Familiales, circular C - 
n° 2009-022, p. 10. 
16 Salaire minimum interprofessionnel de croissance, SMIC. 
17 Caisse Nationale des Allocations Familiales, circular n° 2003-015, 
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as it guarantees welfare access.18 In 2008-2009, clear criteria of eligibility to social assistance 
were eventually introduced. In order to be lawfully residing in France as an economically 
inactive EU citizen and therefore entitled to social assistance, EU citizens are required to have 
health insurance and ‘sufficient resources’. The latter should equal at least six months of the 
standard amount of social assistance.19 Even though economically inactive EU citizens in 
France, unlike in Denmark and Austria, thus may be eligible for social assistance they are in 
practice faced with a high threshold. 
Similar to the administration of EU workers, frontline bureaucrats typically apply these 
clear national rules in practice. EU law, on the other hand, play an insignificant role. In the rare 
case that economically inactive EU citizens has a registration certificate, social authorities grant 
assistance for the period of time equivalent to the duration of the certificate. The duration of the 
validity is defined upon the EU citizen’s resources when applying, i.e. more resources prompt 
slower expiration of the certificate (interview, 8 and 13 and 29 July and 10 August 2016). In 
case economically inactive EU citizens do not have a registration certificate, social authorities 
examine themselves whether the claimants has health insurance and sufficient resources. With 
regard to the latter, social authorities follow the definition as laid down in the circulars 
mentioned above (interviews, 8, 18 and 29 July, 31 August & 28 September). As a consequence, 
only if EU citizens have the amount of money which is necessary for sufficient resources as 
assets or properties, could they qualify for social assistance as only a share of these means20  
was included when calculating the entitlement to social assistance.21 More expansive CJEU 
rulings such as Bidar or Grzelczyk have thus not played a role and, paradoxically, only richer 
EU citizens are eligible for social assistance. The impact of CJEU jurisprudence at the street 
level has thus been thwarted via national guidelines. Similar to the Danish and Austrian cases, 
recent case law such as Dano is perceived to confirm the restrictive interpretation of EU law by 
French authorities (interview, 16 June 2017). 
These restrictive practices and rules are not challenged but rather confirmed by domestic 
courts. Courts signal that authorities can apply the sole condition of lawful residence 
demonstrated via sufficient resources and a health insurance. Namely, ‘the access to social 
assistance benefits depends upon a right of residence and consequently the criteria for a right 
of residence; […] the principle of non-discrimination does not preclude differences in treatment 
if it is justified for objective reasons’.22  
In sum, French frontline practices have uniformly become more restrictive in response 
to strong administrative and judicial signalling since 2008-2009. Both the definition of worker 
and the eligibility criteria of economically inactive EU citizens have become subject to 
restrictive interpretation.  
5 CONCLUSION 
Frontline bureaucrats administer EU rules and jurisprudence in practice. They consider the 
applications of EU citizens on welfare benefits and in doing so decide on eligibility, worker 
status and potentially the right to reside. Their concrete case handling determines the outcomes 
of EU law. In making their decisions, they interpret key concepts such as who is a worker, what 
counts as “sufficient resources” and when to perceive an applicant an “unreasonable burden” 
when it comes to welfare access.  
 
18 Caisse Nationale des Allocations Familiales,circular n°2006-017. 
19 Caisse Nationale des Allocations Familiales, circular n° 2008-024; Caisse Nationale des Allocations Familiales, circular C - 
n° 2009-022, pp. 8, 14, 23. 
20 Assets: 3 % per year; real estate in form of buildings: 50 % per year; properties in form of undeveloped land: 80 % per year. 
21 Caisse Nationale des Allocations Familiales, circular C - n° 2012-014, p. RSA 48. 
22 Administrative court of appeal of Paris, judgment of 20 October 2011, 10PA05222. 
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In principle, EU binding legislation and CJEU decisions should instruct frontline 
bureaucracy. However, rules on free movement of persons and cross-border welfare imply legal 
ambiguity and underspecified key provisions. In this world of legal complexity, the CJEU is 
often called upon to interpret and guide national implementation. But as we have seen, legal 
interpretations deal with individual situations, which are not easily applied to a larger set of 
cases. Despite the rich body of CJEU cases, key concepts thus continue to be underspecified 
and rather open. Even with many years of detailing the worker concept, considerable discretion 
remains. On top of this, more recent CJEU jurisprudence marks a judicial turn. Social rights of 
non-active EU citizens are now increasingly subjected to the conditions as set out in secondary 
legislation. Here, ‘sufficient resources’ and ‘unreasonable burden’ are key administrative 
demarcations upon which EU citizens can be denied not only social benefits but also the right 
to reside.  
Our comparative analysis demonstrates that when SLBs are to make decision on basis of 
rather opaque and ambiguous rules, they turn to their domestic superiors for instructions. In this 
way, signalling from national levels above comes to guide and influence decisions on the 
ground. The signals sent from domestic superiors are picked up at the frontline. In all three 
cases examined, we saw political and administrative superiors effectively signalling a more 
restrictive line towards EU migrants and their cross-border access to welfare benefits. At the 
same time, judicial signals were largely absent or joined in on the restrictive interpretation of 
EU rules and rights. In our case, domestic courts typically did not serve as leverage for 
extending migrants’ rights in national case-handling.  
Hence, through various forms of domestic signalling, even different Member States 
tended to have a uniform (and restrictive) rather than highly varied frontline practice of 
European free movement rules. By exploring how frontline bureaucracy administers complex 
EU rules in day-to-day case-handling, our study joins in on the emerging field of the practical 
implementation of EU law. We come, however, to a rather different conclusion: while others 
have found that frontline practices fragment EU law, we find that such are often subject to 
strong domestic signalling which influence outcomes. In our case, politicisation of free 
movement and cross border welfare, increasingly negatively framed in public debates as 
‘welfare tourism’, appear to be a relevant background factor for the restrictive signalling across 
member states. With politicisation the issue has become more visible and important in various 
member states (Blauberger et al., 2018 ).  
Our study contributes to EU implementation studies by at least three main findings. First, 
it shows that domestic signals on the importance and meaning of EU law influence frontline 
bureaucrats in their case-handling. It matters how domestic superiors perceive and prioritise EU 
law. Secondly, it demonstrates that the politics of such signals are especially important. The 
political and administrative superiors were effective communicators of their preferred 
understanding of EU law, which was largely unchallenged in domestic courts. This finding 
points out that there is considerable room for politics in EU implementation processes and that 
SLBs are responsive hereto. Thirdly, our findings demonstrated that CJEU case law is not 
necessarily attended to on the ground. At the frontline of rule application, CJEU case-law 
appears less powerful and directional for bureaucratic routines and decision-making than 
oftentimes assumed. SLBs do not pay much direct attention to individual CJEU decisions, 
which consequently remain obscure and rather remote from the day-to-day application.  
To conclude, in a world of legal complexity, the signalling of domestic superiors come to 
guide the application of law. In that signalling process, politics play a prominent role, whereas 
European case law proved less influential. Despite the many differences between Denmark, 
Austria and France, signalling came to guide case handling at the bureaucratic frontline towards 
the same restrictive trend. Meanwhile, rules from Brussels and judicial decisions from 
Luxembourg remain rather distant and opaque.  
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